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Redundancy and Aging of Efficient
Multidimensional MDS–Parity Protected
Distributed Storage Systems
Suayb S. Arslan, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The effect of redundancy on the aging of an effi-
cient Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) parity–protected dis-
tributed storage system that consists of multidimensional arrays
of storage units is explored. In light of the experimental evidences
and survey data, this paper develops generalized expressions for
the reliability of array storage systems based on more realistic
time to failure distributions such as Weibull. For instance, a
distributed disk array system is considered in which the array
components are disseminated across the network and are subject
to independent failure rates. Based on such, generalized closed
form hazard rate expressions are derived. These expressions
are extended to estimate the asymptotical reliability behavior
of large scale storage networks equipped with MDS parity-based
protection. Unlike previous studies, a generic hazard rate function
is assumed, a generic MDS code for parity generation is used,
and an evaluation of the implications of adjustable redundancy
level for an efficient distributed storage system is presented.
Results of this study are applicable to any erasure correction
code as long as it is accompanied with a suitable structure and
an appropriate encoding/decoding algorithm such that the MDS
property is maintained.
Index Terms—Redundant array of inexpensive/independent
disks (RAID), aging, error correction coding, reliability, hazard
rate, big data management
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the well known problems associated with parity-
based redundant array of inexpensive disk (RAID) systems
[1] is their vulnerability against multiple disk failures, mostly
after which a restore mechanism is initiated and subsequent
read errors inevitably occur. Similar trends can be observed in
arrays of solid state drives (known as RAIS) for mass storage
applications [2]. The statistical likelihood of multiple drive
failures has never been a significant issue in the past. Over
the years however, with the advanced technology, drives of
few terabyte capacities are now put on sale. The scale of
storage systems continues to grow to store peta-bytes of data
and the likelihood of multiple drive failures become a reality.
This led to the development of error checking and validation
routines to maintain the data integrity. Conventional approach
for data retention was to address the big data protection
shortcomings of RAID by replication, a technique of making
additional copies of data to avoid unrecoverable errors and
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lost data. Organizations also used replication schemes to help
with failure scenarios, such as location specific failures, power
outages, bandwidth unavailability, and so forth. However, as
the size of the stored data scales up, the number of copies of
the data required for robust protection grows. This increases
the amount of inefficiency by adding extra cost to the overall
system. Since replication leads to extremely inefficient use of
system resources, parity-based protection using error correct-
ing codes is more popular.
Drive failures can be regarded as arrivals of a renewal
process at a certain rate. The drive failure rate, using a ho-
mogenous Poisson process, is the reciprocal of the mean time
to failure (MTTF) numbers reported by the drive manufactures
[3]. One of the earliest studies of the reliability analysis for
disk array systems considered various RAID hierarchies and
hot spots [4]. In a number of successive works, stripping
is used as to provide cost-effective I/O systems [1], [5] for
seemless and reliable access to the user data. Most of the
previous research modelings were based on single or double–
parity schemes such as RAID 5 or RAID 6 in which maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes are used for storage efficiency.
MDS codes have the nice property that for a given array
and parity size they allow maximum amount of recovery [6].
However, these studies mostly assume constant failure rate of
small size and cost–effective disk components. Unfortunately,
these set of assumptions are shown to be unrealistic [7], [8].
In fact, an interesting observation is that the failure rates are
rarely constant [8], [9].
There have been efforts in industry as well as in academia
for accurately predicting the reliability of large scale storage
systems in terms of mean lifetime to failure rates. For example,
an accurate yet complicated model is developed to include
catastrophic failures and usage dependent data corruptions
in [10]. The authors specifically pointed out that component
failure rates have little, if not any, to share with the failure rate
of the whole storage system. The times between successive
system failures are reported to be relatively larger than what
conventional models suggest, even though each component
disk hazard rate is increasing [11]. Disk scrubbing is intro-
duced and used in [12] as a remedy for latent defects that
are usually independent of the size, use and the operation of
disks. The latter study also uses homogenous Poisson model
for reliability estimations.
It is clear that excessive failures (failures beyond the cor-
rection capability of the system) in any storage system are of
particular interest because they may cause both unavailability
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and permanent data loss. On the other hand, the trend in the
market is to grow the scale of distributed storage arrays in
which the capacity as well as the reliability of each storage
component almost double every year. Therefore, a true and
accurate failure modeling shall be of great significance from
a system design standpoint. For example, a generic hazard
rate function λ(x) and an associated non-homogenous Pois-
son model might be a better fit for predicting the real life
disk failure trends. However, as more real life scenarios are
incorporated with these improved mathematical methods for
accuracy, they inexorably become complex. From a customer’s
perspective, short-hand closed form expressions for predicting
the system failure rates might be more useful for delivering
performance figures about the system reliability.
In this study, an efficient MDS-parity based distributed disk
array system is considered using general failure processes. One
of the contributions of this paper is a set of useful closed form
expressions, derived by considering the whole lifespan of com-
ponent drives based on the recent survey data on disk failures
and time to failure probability distributions [8], i.e., without
assuming constant component hazard rates. Some asymptotical
results (the array size tends to infinity) shed light for the
limiting behavior of RAID type systems. Those results might
particularly be important for predicting what is achievable
using MDS codes, as the scale of the coded storage systems
grow for the management/maintenance of the so called “Big
data”. The paper also investigates the relationship between the
aging and the redundancy used for data protection. Here, the
efficiency of the distributed storage system comes rather from
the efficient allocation strategy such that independent drive
failure assumption is roughly correct for each component of
the array, which are shared by different storage network nodes.
It is further shown that the multidimensional array storage is
offering a good tradeoff between complexity and performance
which may otherwise be obtained by a large array of one
dimensional RAID type systems at the expense of increased
cost and complexity. Although the main objective of the paper
is focused on the mean time to first failure, the expressions can
be extended to mean time between failures and mean time to
data loss performance metrics. However, derived expressions
might either not be in simple form or expressible in a closed
form for an arbitrary hazard rate function λ(x) and a repair
function µ(x).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, a brief introduction is given about the reliability
theory basics as well as the drive failure statistics in real
world. Moreover, the storage system details is summarized
along with the assumptions used in this work. In Section III,
main results of the paper are given based on arbitrary hazard
rates using multidimensional arrays. This section starts with
considering 1-D arrays and then generalizes the results for
multidimensional arrays. Some of the numerical results and
relevant examples are given in Section IV. Finally, a brief
summary and conclusions follow in Section V. The proofs are
included in appendices A, B and C in order to highlight the
main contributions of the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM DIAGRAM
A. Reliability Theory
When a brand new product is put into service, it performs
functional operations satisfactorily for a period of time, called
useful time period, before eventually a failure occurs and the
device is no longer able to respond to user requests. The
observed time to failure (TTF ) is a continuous random vari-
able with a probability density function fTTF (x), representing
the lifetime of the product until the first failure. The failure
probability of the device can be found using the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of TTF as follows,
FTTF (x) = Pr{TTF ≤ x} =
∫ x
0
fTTF (y)dy, x > 0 (1)
We can think of FTTF (x) as an unreliability measure be-
tween time 0 and x. The reliability function S(x) is therefore
defined by,
S(x) , 1− FTTF (x) =
∫
∞
x
fTTF (y)dy (2)
In other words, reliability is the probability of having
no failures before time x and is related to CDF of TFF
through Eqn. (2). Note that Eqn. (2) implies that we have
fTTF (x) = −dS(x)/dx. It may not be possible to estimate
the distribution function of TFF directly from the available
physical information. A useful function in clarifying the rela-
tionship between physical modes of failure and the probability
distribution of TFF is known as the hazard rate function or
failure rate function, denoted as hTTF (x). This function is
defined to be of the form
hTTF (x) ,
fTTF (x)
S(x)
= −
dS(x)
S(x)dx
(3)
Solution of the first order ordinary differential equation (3)
yields the relationship hTTF (x) = −d(ln(S(x)))/dx with the
initial condition S(0) = 1. Note that knowing the hazard rate
is equivalent to knowing the distribution. Mean time to failure
(MTTF) is defined to be the expected value of the random
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Fig. 1: Hazard rate pattern for hard disk drives as a function of operation
time [13]
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Fig. 2: Assume that the storage units are disks. a) Parallel series of disk arrays that that makes up one disk matrix to be distributed over the network nodes.
Each block represents a disk belonging to one of the parity types [13]. b) A set of these disk matrices are used for storing large scale data using MDS
encoding along each dimension.
variable TTF and is given by
MTTF , E[TTF ] =
∫
∞
0
S(x)dx⇔ lim
x→∞
xS(x) = 0
(4)
where E[.] is the expectation operator. Note that Eqn. (4)
is true for distributions whose mean exists. For the rest of
our discussion, the subscript TTF is dropped for notation
simplicity and throughout the text, hTTF (x) is alternatively
denoted by λ(x).
Annualized failure rate (AFR) is frequently used to estimate
the failure probability of a device or a component after a full-
time year use. In the conventional approach, time between
failures are assumed to be independent and exponentially
distributed with a constant rate λ. Therefore AFR is given
by AFR = 1 − S(x) = 1 − e−λx, where λ = 1/MTTF
and x is the running time index in hours. MTTF is reported
in hours and since there are 8760 hours in a year, AFR =
1− e−8760/MTTF . Typical numbers reported in disk vendor’s
specifications are MTTF ≈ 1 million hours or 1.5 million
hours. Since 8760/MTTF ≪ 1, AFR ≈ 8760/MTTF . As
mentioned before, such rough calculations and assumptions
may not be representing how the drives behave in real world
[8]. Clearly, one needs general but yet adequately simpler
expressions to predict the lifetime trends of such systems,
particularly for large scale storage applications.
B. Drive failures in real world
It is shown in various research articles that average replace-
ment rate of component disks is around twenty times much
greater than are the theoretically predicted MTTF values i.e.,
predicted MTTF values are observed to be an underestimator
for this scenario [8], [13]. It is demonstrated that disk failure
rates show a “bathtub” curve as shown in Fig. 1. Additionally,
contrary to conventional homogenous stochastic models, hard
disk replacement rates do not enter into steady state. After
few years of use, drives (majority of which are disks) are ob-
served to enter into wear-out period in which the failure rates
steadily increase over time. Time between failures are shown
to give much better fit with Weibull or gamma distributions
instead of widely used exponential distribution [8]. There is
a considerable amount of evidence that disk failures that are
placed in the same batch show significant correlations, which
is hard to quantify in a number of applications [14].
C. Efficient storage system summary
A series of parallel array of storage units (such as disk
drives) is shown in Fig. 2 a). Drives are assumed to be
manufactured identically and share the same failure/hazard rate
function λ(x). The kh × kv data matrix is encoded using two
different block MDS codes in order to create a 2-D array.
Horizontally, the parity information type–1 is computed using
a (nh, kh, th + 1) MDS code which can correct up to th
erasures per block. It is due to the MDS property that it
is the maximum number of erasures that a (nh, kh) block
code can correct. Then, the computed parities are allocated
to different disk units and occupy a fraction of the storage
space of the disk array to protect the system against various
types of system and disk failures. In addition to horizontal
encoding, the parity information type–2 is computed using
another (nv, kv, tv+1) MDS code which can correct up to tv
erasures per vertical block. This encoding procedure can be
performed repeatedly to protect larger dimensional data sets.
The order of encoding does not matter as long as the code
is a linear block code. A generalization of such an encoding
scheme for three dimensional data is depicted in Fig. 2 b).
Finally, encoded data units are allocated into the network
storage nodes according to a genuine allocation policy that
will keep
(i) the read and write process simple,
(ii) the number of storage nodes needed to be accessed
for the reconstruction of user/parity data minimum at a
reasonable time complexity
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(iii) drives in the horizontal or vertical arrays (for 2-D array
case) not shared by the same node of the distributed
storage system.
These set of assumptions also help us make independent
failure assumptions between the component drives of an array
while in the mean time facilitate the rest of our analysis.
III. DISK ARRAYS WITH INDIVIDUAL INDEPENDENT
ARBITRARY HAZARD RATES
In the rest of our discussions, an allocation policy and a
generic MDS code are assumed such that conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii) are satisfied. Therefore, the rest of the discussion is
based on the independent failure statistics assumption between
respective drives of the storage array. A series of parallel arrays
of disks is considered in which each array contains n disks or
drives to store the encoded user data information. Let us use
a common notation (n, k, t+1) where t = n−k for the MDS
code in order to make it general and applicable to each and
every dimension to which erasure coding is applied.
A. A Horizontal system and componentwise reliability
Let us consider a 1-D array of storage units. Note that the
results of this subsection can be applied to other arrays of
different dimensions. This subsection starts with stating our
main theorem below that bridges the relationship between
redundancy and aging of MDS parity-based arrays.
Theorem 1: Hazard rate per data component of a hori-
zontal system (consisting of n independent components k of
which are data, each component having an arbitrary but the
same failure rate of λ(x)), coded with a generic (n, k, t+ 1)
block MDS code with rate r = k/n (t = n − k parity units)
is given by
µc(x, n, r) =
λ(x)
r
(
1−
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x))
ψt(n, λ(x))
)
(5)
where
ψt(z, n, λ(x)) ,
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
i
z
)
(1−R(x))iR(x)n−i,
R(x) = e−
∫
x
0
λ(y)dy is the reliability of constituent compo-
nents with hazard rate λ(x) and ψt(n, λ(x)) , ψt(0, n, λ(x))
is the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distri-
bution. Furthermore, the following inequality is satisfied for
0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1
max
{
0,
1−R(x)/r
1−R(x)
}
≤
µc(x, n, r)
λ(x)
(6)
Proof : See Appendix A.
Two cases shed some interesting light to this relationship.
Consider the case with t = 0 and r = 1, i.e., no redun-
dancy. In this case, since ψt−1(n − 1, λ(x)) = 0 we have
µc(x, n, 1) = λ(x) as expected. In other words, the hazard
rate of the horizontal system per component is the same as
the hazard rate of the constituent components when there is
no redundancy. On the other extreme, we could have t = n−1
and r = 1/n using replication. In this case, the hazard rate
per data component is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Using a (n, 1, n) block MDS code, known as
repetition code, the hazard rate per data component is given
by
µc(x, n, 1/n) =
nλ(x)R(x)(1 −R(x))n−1
1− (1−R(x))n
(7)
where R(x) = e−
∫
x
0
λ(y)dy is the reliability of constituent
components with hazard rate λ(x).
Proof : Let us set t = n− 1, we have
ψn−1(n, λ(x)) = ψn(n, λ(x)) − (1−R(x))
n
= 1− (1 −R(x))n (8)
ψn−2(n− 1, λ(x)) = ψn−1(n− 1, λ(x)) − (1−R(x))
n−1
= 1− (1 −R(x))n−1. (9)
The result will follow through some algebraic manipulations
by plugging Eqns. (8) and (9) into Eqn. (5). 
A well known binary linear block MDS code is the parity
code in which there is only one parity symbol i.e., t = 1 and
r = (n − 1)/n. Following corollary characterizes the hazard
rate of 1-D array using parity coding.
Corollary 3: Using a (n, n− 1, 2) binary block MDS code,
known as parity code, the hazard rate per data component of
a horizontal block is given by
µc(x, n, 1− 1/n) =
λ(x)n(1 −R(x))
n(1−R(x)) +R(x)
(10)
where R(x) = e−
∫
x
0
λ(y)dy is the reliability of constituent
components with failure rate λ(x).
Proof : We recognize that for t = 1 and,
ψ0(n− 1, λ(x)) = R(x)
n−1 (11)
ψ1(n, λ(x)) = R(x)
n + n(1−R(x))R(x)n−1(12)
By plugging Eqns. (11) and (12) into Eqn. (5), with r =
1− 1/n, we have
µc(x, n, 1− 1/n) =
λ(x)
r
(
1−
1
R(x) + n(1−R(x))
)
(13)
=
λ(x)n
n− 1
(
(n− 1)(1 −R(x))
R(x) + n(1−R(x))
)
(14)
=
λ(x)n(1 −R(x))
n(1−R(x)) +R(x)
(15)
as desired. 
In Theorem 1, if R(x) ≥ r, the lower bound becomes zero,
whereas if R(x) < r, the lower bound takes on a non-zero
value. Let us define a system to be componentwise reliable
(CR) if the hazard rate per drive component is zero or close
to zero although the hazard rate of the whole system might
be non-zero. Therefore, an interesting question is whether the
lower bound of Theorem 1 is achievable for any real value of
R(x) and r as n grows large. This question will be explored
next.
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Fig. 3: a) Asymptotic per component hazard rate when R(a) = 1/q where q = 3/2 using an MDS code. b) Asymptotically achievable bound as a function
of rate r and q. As can be seen as q gets larger, the hazard rate per component tends to λ(x) and become less dependent on rate. λ(a) = 0.01 is assumed.
B. Asymptotical hazard rate expressions
Regardless of the reliability distribution model used, as x→
∞, the reliability of constituent components, R(x) tends to
zero. Therefore, one of the information Theorem 1 conveys is
that for a fixed block length of n, if we let R(x) → 0, we
have the following lower bound,
lim
x→∞
µc(x, n, r) ≥ λ(x). (16)
Therefore, one might expect gains due to erasure coding
in the infant mortality and useful time period, but not much
in long term wear-out periods for 1-D arrays. As the number
of component disks increases with the growing need for big
data storage, the corresponding system reliability might be
going down. It is of interest therefore to look at the asymptotic
behavior n → ∞ of these reliability expressions at different
times x.
Let us start with evaluating the limiting behavior n → ∞
for a finite non-zero value of a such that R(a) = 1/q for
q = 2, 3, . . . . In other words, for a given λ(x), find a such that∫ a
0 λ(y)dy = ln q. For this special case, we have the following
asymptotic result that shows the lower bound of Theorem 1 is
achievable.
Theorem 4: Asymptotic hazard rate per data component
of a horizontal system (as n → ∞, each component having
an arbitrary but the same failure rate of λ(x)), coded with a
generic (n, k, t+1) MDS block code with a fixed rate r = k/n
is given by
µc(a, n, r) =
{
λ(a)(qr−1)
r(q−1) if r ≥ R(a) = 1q
0 Otherwise
(17)
where a satisfies the relationship ∫ a
0
λ(y)dy = ln q for a given
positive integer q.
Proof : See Appendix B. The proof also conjectures that
this theorem can be extended to any q ∈ R, q > 1.
For r ≥ 1/q, let us divide both the numerator and
denumerator by qr and replace q with 1/R(a). We will
have µc(a, n, r) = λ(a)
(
1−R(a)/r
1−R(a)
)
. Yet, this is the lower
bound predicted by Theorem 1 evaluated at point x = a.
Therefore, Theorem 4 proves that the lower bound of The-
orem 1 is achievable for a countably infinite number of
values of R(x). We also conjecture that the lower bound
of Theorem 1 is achievable for any value of R(x) i.e., for
any q ∈ R, q > 1. Let us provide an example to support
this conjecture by setting q = 3/2, a non-integer value,
and λ(argmina
{
|
∫ a
0
λ(y)dy − ln q|
}
) = 0.01 is fixed for
simplicity. We plot the asymptotic result, the lower bound due
to Theorem 1 as well as the actual computation in Fig. 3 a).
As can be seen asymptotic result of Theorem 4 achieves the
lower bound of Theorem 1 for r ≥ 2/3, below which we have
a CR system if n is very large. However, if n = 50 or n = 300
we observe some performance loss and in order to obtain a
CR system we must have r ≤ 0.12 and r ≤ 0.46, respectively.
So far, we have assumed that the size of the array n is
increased for a given fixed value of R(x). If R(x) → 0 i.e.,
q →∞, we can see that the hazard rate per component of an
MDS-protected array will converge to λ(x). This is shown for
a fixed value λ = 0.01 in Fig. 3 b). Yet, a general practice
should be adaptively increasing the size n as R(x) tends to
zero i.e., as the reliability of components go down with time.
The following theorem characterizes this scenario with the
assumptions of an adaptive system: limn→∞
x→∞
nR(x) <∞ and
limn→∞
x→0
n(1 − R(x)) < ∞ and shows that a CR system is
possible for large scale storage even if the component drives
are in their wear-out period.
Theorem 5: if limn→∞
x→∞
nR(x) < ∞ and limn→∞
x→0
n(1 −
R(x)) < ∞ , asymptotic hazard rate per data component
of a horizontal system (as n → ∞, each component having
an arbitrary but the same failure rate of λ(x)), coded with a
generic (n, k, t+1) MDS block code with a fixed rate r = k/n
is given by
lim
n→∞
x→a
µc(x, n, r) =
λ(x)C(x, r, a)
n
(18)
where
C(x, r, a) =
{
1/r if a =∞
1−R(x)
(R(x)−r)(2R(x)−r−1) if a = 0
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Proof : See Appendix C.
The amount of redundancy has a positive effect on the
component hazard rate λ(x) for this particular scenario. For a
fixed n, the hazard rate for overall disk array was found to be
scaling with rnλ(x) if n → ∞ first, then R(x) → 0. On the
other hand if R(x) → 0 and n → ∞ at the same time such
that their product stays constant, this hazard rate converges to
λ(x), i.e., k = rn times less than that of the fixed n case.
Large block length improves the reliability performance at
the expense of increased complexity. Note also that although
the per component hazard rates might be tending to zero, the
overall array hazard rate is nonzero.
The results of this subsection establishes an important
relationship between the concept of CR and the rate r of the
MDS code used. However, we assumed that the rate r is fixed
through the whole lifespan of the storage system. Thus, it
is easy to see that at some point in time x′ we will have
r > R(x′) and µc(x′, n, r) 6= 0 even if n → ∞. Thus in
order to obtain a CR system at all times, MDS codes with
time varying rate r(x) might be quite useful. In fact, there
are asymptotically MDS codes called fountain codes that can
be a perfect fit for this particular scenario [15]. Using such
codes, rate can be adjusted on the fly such that r(x) ≤ R(x)
is satisfied for all x if the condition of CR is strictly imposed
on the design throughout the lifespan of the storage system.
C. Multidimensional disk arrays
Although the potential for a CR system is shown using
large 1-D MDS-protected arrays, the implementation details
and real life conditions make it impractical to achieve idealized
performance benefits. Therefore, different directions must be
taken for practical means such as multidimensional arrays
using MDS codes. This is one of the natural ways to construct
long blocks of many drives that can help us realize the
asymptotical results derived in the previous subsection.
Previous section considered replaceable drive components in
a 1-D horizontal structure and posed the question for any type
of MDS code of rate rh. Let us assume that we have a series of
such parallel blocks of drives of hazard rate khµc(x, nh, rh) as
shown in Fig. 2 a), generated by another MDS code of rate rv .
In other words, we have nv 1-D arrays of size nh drives each,
such that if more than nv(1 − rv) blocks fail, it will lead to
the whole system failure. This is due to the MDS property of
the erasure correction coding. Furthermore, we assume inter-
block failure independence and if a horizontal block fails, all
the constituent disks are assumed to be failed. For a general
case, this type of decoding procedure corresponds to the failure
of T-D disk array, if at least one (T-1)-D disk array fails.
More complicated decoding procedures can be employed for
better performance at the expense of increased implementation
complexity.
Let µc(x, nhnv, rhrv) be the hazard rate per data compo-
nent of the 2-D disk array. Using the result of Theorem 1, we
shall obtain
µc(x, nhnv, rhrv) =
µc(x, nh, rh)
khrv
×
(
1−
ψ(1−rv)nv−1(nv − 1, khµc(x, nh, rh))
ψ(1−rv)nv (nv, khµc(x, nh, rh))
)
(19)
The result follows from Theorem 1 by replacing λ(x)
with khµc(x, nh, rh) and n with nv. Finally, the system
failure rate is divided by the total number of data disks
in a horizontal array. This expression is indeed a special
case of the following more general result on T-D disk array
system encoded with a set of MDS codes with parameters
{(n1, r1),(n2, r2),. . . ,(nT , rT )}. Note that 3-D case is shown
in Fig. 2 b) and larger dimensional generalizations are possible
yet are hard to visualize.
Theorem 6: For T-D MDS-protected system of drives or
disks, we have
µc(x, n1,T , r1,T ) =
µc(x, n1,T−1, r1,T−1)
r1,Tn1,T−1
(20)
×
(
1−
ψ(1−rT )nT−1(nT − 1, k1,T−1µc(x, n1,T−1, r1,T−1))
ψ(1−rT )nT (nT , k1,T−1µc(x, n1,T−1, r1,T−1))
)
(21)
where n1,s ,
∏s
i=1 ni, r1,s ,
∏s
i=1 ri and k1,s = r1,sn1,s.
Proof : (sketch) Proof follows from Theorem 1 by re-
placing λ(x) with k1,T−1µc(x, n1,T−1, r1,T−1) in which
µc(x, n1,T−1, r1,T−1) is the hazard rate per component for
(T-1)-D parity protected system and k1,T−1 is the number of
data component disks. In this case, the result of Theorem 1 can
be applied to compute the hazard rate of a disk hyperplane of
dimension T-1. In order to find the hazard rate per component,
we divide the overall hazard rate function by the number of
components k1,T−1. We eventually obtain the result using the
fact r1,T−1rT = r1,T . 
IV. EXAMPLES AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, results will be provided for some of the
special cases for finite block lengths so that a comparison can
be made with asymptotical results. Reliability of multidimen-
sional arrays will be compared in terms of component as well
as array level hazard rates.
1) Constant hazard rate components with r = 1/n:
Consider a parallel block and the non-aging components with
a constant and identical rate i.e., λ(x) = λ. Using Corollary
2 and R(x) = e−λx for constant rate λ(x) = λ, as derived in
[16], we have
µc(x, n, r) =
nλe−λx(1− e−λx)n−1
1− (1− e−λx)n
(22)
Note that this constant failure rate assumption was originally
used by manufactures to predict the failure trends. Equation
(22) can be approximated as µc(x, n, r) ≈ nλnxn−1 when
x ≪ 1/λ. As x → ∞, the hazard rate converges to λ,
achieving the lower bound of Theorem 1. In its early use,
the system failure rate grows as a power function of age
which is known as the Weibull law. This means that using
more redundancy within the block triggers aging although the
constituent parts are non-aging components.
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Fig. 4: Hazard rate function per component for 1-D disk array system as a
function of time with and without coding. λ(x) is assumed to be a simple
bathtub curve obtained by using a composite distribution based on Weibull
models. Let us assume n = 100 disks per array.
2) Non-constant hazard rate components using arbitrary r:
Let us consider a general form of λ(x) that is in bathtub shape
using a composite distribution model1 given by
λ(x) =


β1t
β1−1
θβ
1
if 0 < t ≤ t1
β2t
β2−1
θ
β2
2
if t1 < t ≤ t2
β3t
β3−1
θ
β3
3
if t > t2
(23)
with the corresponding reliability function,
R(x) =


e
−
(
x
θ1
)β1−1
if 0 < t ≤ t1
e
−
(
x−t1
θ2
)β2−1
−
(
t1
θ1
)β1−1
if t1 < t ≤ t2
e
−
(
x−t2
θ3
)β3−1
−
(
t2−t1
θ2
)β2−1
−
(
t1
θ1
)β1−1
if t > t2
(24)
For useful life period (random failure process) between time
t1 and t2, let us set β2 = 1 and θ2 = 200. For the early
life (infancy), we use β1 = 0.5 and θ = 100 to model the
decreasing failure rates. In order to model the wear-out period,
let us set β3 = 2.5 and θ3 = 500. An example is shown in
Fig. 4 for an array of disks (n = 100) using MDS codes with
different rates. As predicted by asymptotical expressions, for
x → 0 we have µc(x, 100, r) → 0 and for x → ∞ we have
µc(x, 100, r) → λ(x). This figure also suggests that there is
a key number of parities such that the useful life time period
can be widened i.e., we have constant failure rates for longer
period of time with coding. Another interesting observation
is that coded system improves the wear-out period only if
exceeding number of parities are used i.e. a rate of 1/10 gives
us a reasonable improvement although the aging can be greatly
reduced at early life period for each component disk.
In the next set of results, let us compare 1-D array of n =
300 disks in which half of the disks are dedicated to parity to
a 2-D array of disks of the same size and relative redundancy,
1 A Weibull hazard function is used to model three different periods of
failure processes by appropriately choosing the parameters of the distribution.
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Fig. 5: Array hazard rate function using different MDS codes and structures.
λ(x) is assumed to be a simple bathtub curve obtained by using a composite
distribution based on Weibull assumption. Number of disks in each system is
300 and the total rate of each MDS code is 1/2.
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3−D disk array (n1=25,r1=0.6, n2=12,r2=0.8, n3=10, r3=0.8)
2−D disk array (n1=60,r1=0.5, n2=50,r2=0.8)
Fig. 6: Component hazard rate function using multidimensional MDS codes
and structures. λ(x) is assumed to be a simple bathtub curve obtained by
using a composite distribution based on Weibull models. Number of disks in
each system is 3000 and the total rate of each MDS code is 0.4.
encoded with (25, 15, 11) and (12, 10, 3) MDS codes both in
horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. Let us focus
on array hazard rates i.e., data loss rate rather than individual
disk hazard rates and assume independence. The results are
presented in log-log scale in Fig. 5. As can be seen, using a
2-D coding structure the data loss rate can greatly be lessened.
In fact, since the block length and the rate of the component
codes of the 2-D MDS code are reduced, some performance
loss is observed at the infancy period. However, 2-D structure
might be easier to implement as the MDS codes are of shorter
length and larger rate are utilized.
Let us look at the individual data component disk hazard
rates for a 3-D structure with an overall rate 0.4 and n = 3000
disks. Fig. 6 shows the data component disk hazard rates for
1-D, 2-D and 3-D disk array structures of the same size.
Component MDS codes for 2-D structure have the parameters
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(60, 30, 31) and (50, 40, 11) whereas for 3-D structure, they
have the parameters (25, 15, 11), (12, 10, 3) and (10, 8, 3).
As can be observed, although the array hazard rates show
better performance with multi-dimensional MDS structures,
the component hazard rates are worse compared to that of
1-D disk array. This is mainly due to 1-D MDS-protected
system performs better (in fact it comes close to the perfor-
mance lower bound) than multiple short block length MDS
codes of the same rate. However, the performance gain of
multidimensional disk structures is rather in terms of low
complexity due to using short block length and high rate
MDS codes. In addition, if the array of disks fail for 1-D
structure, the whole system fails and data is lost. On the other
hand, multidimensional structures have many arrays of shorter
length and it is low probability to lose all of them at once.
It is not hard to see that data component disk hazard rates
of multidimensional structures (2-D and 3-D arrays in our
case) are close to that of 1-D array, particularly for useful
and wear-out time periods. This means that the lower bounds
can be achieved using multidimensional structures for a large
fraction of time of a drive’s lifespan. Finally, we note that our
arguments are based on a conventional decoding algorithm
used for product codes, more advanced algorithms might
improve the over all decoding performance.
V. CONCLUSION
Generalized expressions are given for disk arrays that are
protected by MDS-parities. A brief analysis of the interaction
is also presented between redundancy and aging of MDS-
parity based disk array systems in a distributed storage sce-
nario. The relationship between redundancy level and aging is
demonstrated using general formulations and accurate distri-
butions that is more reflective of the real life failure scenarios.
Asymptotic results show that performance lower bounds are
achievable with large scale storage networks as long as inde-
pendence is assumed among the component failures. Although
neat compact form expressions may not exist for some of the
derivations, numerical results provide some intuition about the
behavior of such disk arrays under independent failure modes.
Results are extended to include multidimensional disk arrays
to show that there might be practical ways to get close to
predicted performance lower bounds for the component hazard
rates.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us begin this section with the following lemma.
Lemma 7: The function ψt(z, n, λ(x)) satisfies the follow-
ing relationship for any integer z, satisfying 0 ≤ z ≤ n
ψt(z, n, λ(x))
ψt−z(n− z, λ(x))
=
(
n
z
)
(1−R(x))z (25)
where ψt(n, λ(x)) , ψt(0, n, λ(x)) is the cumulative distri-
bution function of the binomial distribution.
Proof : First note that for z > i, we have the con-
vention
(
i
z
)
= 0. Therefore we rewrite the expression for
ψt(z, n, λ(x)),
=
t∑
i=z
(
n
i
)(
i
z
)
(1−R(x))iR(x)n−i (26)
=
t∑
i=z
(
n− z
i− z
)(
n
z
)
(1 −R(x))iR(x)n−i (27)
=
(
n
z
)
(1−R(x))
z
t∑
i=z
(
n− z
i− z
)
(1−R(x))i−zR(x)n−i
(28)
=
(
n
z
)
(1−R(x))
z
t−z∑
j=0
(
n− z
j
)
(1−R(x))jR(x)n−z−j
(29)
=
(
n
z
)
(1−R(x))z ψt−z(n− z, λ(x)) (30)
from which the result follows. Note that we make the change
of variables j = i− z in Eqn. (29) and the Eqn. (27) follows
from binomial coefficient identity
(
n
i
)(
i
z
)
=
(
n−z
i−z
)(
n
z
)
. 
After establishing a useful lemma, let us give the proof of
Theorem 1. It is clear that a horizontal block failure will occur
only if t+1 or more disks fail in the horizontal block of size
n disks2. Due to independence assumption, the reliability of
such a block is given by
S(x) =
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1−R(x))iR(x)(n−i) = ψt(n, λ(x)). (31)
Let us find the probability density function of the time
between component failures. This is given by
fX(x) = −S
′(x) = −
dS(x)
dx
(32)
=
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
){
iR′(x)
1−R(x)
(1−R(x))iR(x)(n−i)
−
(n− i)R′(x)
R(x)
(1−R(x))iR(x)(n−i)
}
(33)
= −n
R′(x)
R(x)
ψt(n, λ(x)) (34)
+
R′(x)
R(x)
1
1−R(x)
ψt(1, n, λ(x))
= λ(x)nψt(n, λ(x)) −
λ(x)ψt(1, n, λ(x))
1−R(x)
(35)
where we used the fact that R′(x)/R(x) = −λ(x). Thus,
finally from Eqn. (3), we compute the total hazard rate for
all k data components (a series of k data storage units) as
2Since the controller of disk array systems can identify which disks are
failed, MDS codes are used to correct erasures.
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follows3,
kµc(x, n, r) =
fX(x)
S(x)
=
fX(x)
ψt(n, λ(x))
=λ(x)
(
n−
ψt(1, n, λ(x))/ψt(n, λ(x))
1−R(x)
)
(36)
If we use the result of Lemma 7 with z = 1, i.e.,
ψt(1, n, λ(x)) = n(1−R(x))ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x)) (37)
and Eqn. (36) then we arrive at Eqn. (5).
As for the lower bound, we observe the following relation-
ship due to t ≥ i,
tψt(0, n, λ(x)) ≥ ψt(1, n, λ(x)) (38)
Using above equation and Eqn. (37), we can proceed as
follows,
µc(x, n, r) ≥
λ(x)
r
(
1−
t
n(1−R(x))
)
(39)
=
λ(x)
r
(
r −R(x)
1−R(x)
)
(40)
from which the lower bound follows. Notice that if R(x) > r,
then this lower bound takes on negative values. Therefore,
the maximum operator is introduced to make the lower bound
non-negative. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Let R(a) = 1/q for some a > 0, q > 1, we have
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(a)) =
t−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1−
1
q
)i(
1
q
)n−1−i
= q−n+1
t−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
q − 1
q
)i (
1
q
)
−i
= q−n+1
t−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
(q − 1)i (41)
and similarly,
ψt(n, λ(a)) = q
−n
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i (42)
Using an asymptotic result from coding theory that in a q-
ary n dimensional linear space Fnq , Hamming spheres (balls) of
radius t can be bounded for large n and t/n = 1−r ≤ 1−1/q
i.e., r ≥ 1/q by
q(hq(1−r)−o(1))n ≤
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ≤ qhq(1−r)n (43)
3We note that the horizontal system failure rate is always equal to the
sum of the component failure rates, regardless of the distributions used to
describe the components. In other words, let λH(x) be the failure rate of a
horizontal system that consists of N components. If the component failure
rates are characterized by the set of hazard rates {λi(x)}Ni=1, it is not hard to
show that λH (x) =
∑
N
i=1
λi(x). This result is used implicitly throughout
the paper to find the per component hazard rates of multidimensional coded
storage systems.
where hq(p) is the q-ary entropy function given by
hq(p) , p logq(q − 1) + p logq
(
1
p
)
+ (1− p) logq
(
1
1− p
)
(44)
and o(1) → 0 as n → ∞. In the context of coding theory, q
is usually an integer representing the size of the alphabet over
which the code is defined. Here in our case, it is not to hard
to show that Eqn. (43) is valid for any value of q ∈ R as long
as qr ≥ 1. Finally, we observe that
qhq(1−
rn
n−1
)(n−1)−o(n)−hq(1−r)n+1
≤
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(a))
ψt(n, λ(a))
≤
qhq(1−
rn
n−1
)(n−1)−hq(1−r)n+o(n)+1 (45)
and ∃ǫ > 0 such that the following assures the convergence
for large n,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣ψt−1(n− 1, λ(a))ψt(n, λ(a))
− q(n−1)hq(1−
rn
n−1
)−nhq(1−r)+1
∣∣∣∣∣> ǫ
}
= 0 (46)
Let us use the definition for hq(p) to expand our expression
along with the asymptotical results that limn→∞ logq(1 −
rn
n−1 ) = logq(1− r) and limn→∞ logq(
rn
n−1 ) = logq(r)
logq(q
hq(1−
rn
n−1
)(n−1)−hq(1−r)n+1)
= (n− 1)hq(1−
rn
n− 1
)− nhq(1− r) + 1 (47)
where
(n− 1)hq(1−
rn
n− 1
)
= (n− 1)
[(
1−
rn
n− 1
)
logq(q − 1)
−
(
1−
rn
n− 1
)
logq (1− r) −
(
rn
n− 1
)
logq (r)
]
(48)
= (n− 1− rn) logq(q − 1)− (n− 1− rn) logq (1− r)
− rn logq (r) (49)
and similarly,
nhq(1 − r) = (n− rn) logq(q − 1)− (n− rn) logq (1− r)
− rn logq (r) (50)
Finally, let us use Eqns (49) and (50) to obtain,
(n− 1)hq(1−
rn
n− 1
)− nhq(1− r) + 1
= 1− logq(q − 1) + logq(1 − r) (51)
= logq
(
q(1 − r)
q − 1
)
(52)
This result justifies that, for large enough n, we have the
following convergence
q(n−1)hq(1−
rn
n−1
)−nhq(1−r)+1 →
q(1− r)
q − 1
(53)
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which completes the proof for r ≥ 1/q. For r ≤ 1/q, we have
q(1 − r)
q − 1
≥ 1 (54)
On the other hand, It is easy to see that for t ≤ n− 1
t∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
(q − 1)i+1 ≥
t−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
(q − 1)i+1 (55)
=
t∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
(q − 1)i (56)
=
t∑
i=0
[(
n
i
)
−
(
n− 1
i
)]
(q − 1)i
(57)
from which we obtain,
q
t∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
(q − 1)i ≥
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i (58)
Using a similar argument, we can show that
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(a))
ψt(n, λ(a))
=
q
q − 1
(
1−
∑t
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
(q − 1)i∑t
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i
)
(59)
and using Eqn. (58), we obtain
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(a))
ψt(n, λ(a))
≤ 1 (60)
Combining Eqn. (54) and Eqn. (60), we have
ψt−1(n−1,λ(a))
ψt(n,λ(a))
= 1 for n → ∞. Finally, this implies
µc(a, n, r)→ 0 as n→∞ if r ≤ 1/q. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Before proving Theorem 5, let us first prove the following
useful lemmas.
Lemma 8: The ratio of an incomplete Gamma function to a
complete Gamma function satisfies the following relationship,
1−
b
a− b− 1
<
Γ(a, b)
Γ(a)
=
Γ(a, b)
(a− 1)!
< 1 (61)
where Γ(a, b) =
∫
∞
b t
a−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma
function.
Proof : Let us explore the difference,
Γ(a)− Γ(a, b) =
∫ b
0
ta−1e−tdt
<
∫ b
0
ba−1e−bdt (62)
= bae−b
=
b
a− b− 1
∫ a−1
b
ba−1e−bdt
<
b
a− b− 1
∫ a−1
b
ta−1e−tdt (63)
<
b
a− b− 1
∫
∞
0
ta−1e−tdt (64)
=
b
a− b− 1
Γ(a) (65)
which establishes the lower bound. The upper bound follows
from the definition of incomplete beta function. Note that the
integrand ta−1e−t achieves its maximum at t = a − 1 and
for 0 < t < a − 1, it is increasing. Thus, for 0 < t < b, we
have the inequality (62) and for b < t < a − 1 we have the
inequality (63). 
Lemma 8 indicates that for a fixed b > 0 and a → ∞,
Γ(a, b)→ Γ(a). In addition, for a fixed b > 0 and a≫ b, we
have the following approximation
Γ(a, b)
Γ(a)
≈
a− 2b− 1
a− b− 1
(66)
Lemma 9: As n → ∞ and R(x) → 0 while satisfying
limn→∞
x→∞
nR(x) <∞, we have the following convergence
ψt(n, λ(x)) −→ 1−
Γ(k, nR(x))
Γ(k)
≈
nR(x)
k − nR(x)− 1
(67)
and as n → ∞ and x → 0 while satisfying limn→∞
x→0
n(1 −
R(x)) <∞, we have the following convergence
ψt(n, λ(x)) −→
Γ(t+ 1, n(1−R(x)))
Γ(t+ 1)
≈
2R(x)− r − 1
R(x)− r
(68)
where R(x) = e−
∫
x
0
λ(y)dy
.
Proof : First note the following relationship,
ψt(n, λ(x)) =
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1−R(x))iR(x)n−i (69)
=
n∑
j=n−t
(
n
j
)
R(x)j(1−R(x))n−j
= 1−
n−t−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
R(x)j(1 −R(x))n−j
If limn→∞
x→∞
nR(x) <∞, then the asymptotical convergence
of binomial distribution to Poisson distribution yields(
n
j
)
R(x)j(1−R(x))n−j →
njR(x)je−nR(x)
j!
(70)
Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have
ψt(n, λ(x)) = 1−
n−t−1∑
j=0
njR(x)je−nR(x)
j!
(71)
= 1−
Γ(n− t, nR(x))
(n− t− 1)!
(72)
= 1−
Γ(k, nR(x))
Γ(k)
(73)
and using the approximation (66) with a = k and b = nR(x),
the Eqn. (67) follows. Note that if n→∞, then k = nr →∞.
Similarly, using Eqn. (69) and same line of proof, we can
obtain Eqn. (68) 
Next, we give the proof of Theorem 5. First, consider
n→∞ and R(x)→ 0 while satisfying limn→∞
x→∞
nR(x) <∞.
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Using the results of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we can approx-
imate the limiting ratio,
1−
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x))
ψt(n, λ(x))
→ 1−
(n− 1)R(x)
nR(x)
×
nr − nR(x)− 1
nr − (n− 1)R(x)− 1
=
nr − 1
n(nr − (n− 1)R(x)− 1)
(74)
≈
1
n
(75)
Therefore, we have kµc(x, n, r) → kλ(x)nr = λ(x) which
establishes what is asserted.
Similarly, let us consider n → ∞ and x → 0 while satis-
fying limn→∞
x→0
n(1−R(x)) <∞. Let b = (n− 1)(1−R(x))
and use lemma 8, Lemma 9 and the approximation (66).
Employing some algebraic manipulations, we can obtain
n
(
1−
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x))
ψt(n, λ(x))
)
≈ n

1− 1− b/(t− b− 1)
1− b+1−R(x)t−b+R(x)−1


(76)
=
R(x)(t− 1)− t+ b+ 1
(t− b− 1)(t− 2b+ 2R(x)− 2)
(77)
Let us divide both the numerator and denominator by n2.
Letting n → ∞, we can approximate the limiting ratio as
follows
n
(
1−
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x))
ψt(n, λ(x))
)
→
r(1 −R(x))
(R(x)− r)(2R(x) − r − 1)
Therefore using Theorem 1, we have
kµc(x, n, r) = nλ(x)
(
1−
ψt−1(n− 1, λ(x))
ψt(n, λ(x))
)
(78)
→
λ(x)r(1 −R(x))
(R(x)− r)(2R(x) − r − 1)
(79)
which completes the proof. 
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